[ LOCK-ROOM ]

SYS_STABILITY: 100%

ENC_PROTOCOL: AES-GCM-256

NODE_REGION: UNKNOWN

LINK_ESTABLISHED

[
LOCK-ROOM
]

ZERO_KNOWLEDGE_ARCHITECTURE_V.4.0.1

A password vault where the server is structurally incapable of reading your data. Your secrets are encrypted before they ever leave your device.

HEX_PARITY_VERIFIED

SYSTEM_CAPABILITIES

SECURITY_FEATURES

ENCRYPTION

AES-GCM-256

Every credential is encrypted with AES-GCM-256 before storage. The same cipher trusted by military and intelligence agencies worldwide.

ARCHITECTURE

ZERO_KNOWLEDGE

The server holds only ciphertext. Without your master key, the data is mathematically indistinguishable from random noise.

KEY_DERIVATION

PBKDF2_SHA512

Your master password is never transmitted. It derives a local encryption key via 600,000 PBKDF2 iterations with SHA-512.

PRIVACY

SERVER_BLIND

The backend processes only opaque blobs. No plaintext, no metadata, no behavioral analytics. Structural privacy by design.

EXECUTION

CLIENT_SIDE_CRYPTO

All cryptographic operations run inside your browser or native client. The network sees only encrypted payloads.

RESILIENCE

RECOVERY_KEY

Generate a recovery key that encrypts your master key client-side. If you lose your password, recover your vault without the server ever seeing the key.

TRANSPARENCY

OPEN_PROTOCOL

The encryption protocol is fully documented and open source. Verify every claim independently. No security through obscurity.

ZERO_KNOWLEDGE_PROTOCOL

HOW_IT_WORKS

01

KEY_DERIVATION

MASTER_KEY_NEVER_LEAVES

You enter your master password. PBKDF2-SHA512 with 600k iterations derives an encryption key locally. The raw password is immediately discarded from memory.

> PBKDF2(password, salt, 600000, SHA-512) → encryption_key
02

CLIENT_SIDE_ENCRYPTION

DATA_ENCRYPTED_LOCALLY

Your vault entries are encrypted with AES-GCM-256 in your browser before any network call is made. The server receives only ciphertext and an authentication tag.

> AES-GCM(plaintext, encryption_key, iv) → ciphertext + tag
03

DOUBLE_LAYER_ENCRYPTION

SERVER_ADDS_SECOND_LAYER

The server applies its own AES-GCM-256 encryption on top of your already-encrypted data. Even if the database leaks, attackers face two independent encryption layers.

> server.encrypt(client_ciphertext, server_key) → L2_ciphertext
04

RECOVERY_KEY

ZERO_KNOWLEDGE_RECOVERY

Generate a recovery key stored only by you. It encrypts your master key client-side and sends the opaque blob to the server. Lost your password? Decrypt locally with the recovery key — the server never sees it.

> AES-GCM(master_key, recovery_key) → recovery_blob → server

CRYPTOGRAPHIC_PARAMETERS

SECURITY_SPECS

CIPHERAES-GCM-256
KEY_DERIVATIONPBKDF2-SHA512
ITERATIONS600,000
IV_LENGTH96 BITS
TAG_LENGTH128 BITS
ENCRYPTION_LAYERS2 (CLIENT + SERVER)
TRANSPORTTLS 1.3
SERVER_KNOWLEDGENONE
RECOVERY_METHODCLIENT-SIDE KEY
PLAINTEXT_STORAGENEVER

AUDIT_CHECKLIST

[VERIFIED]CRYPTOGRAPHIC_PROTOCOL
[VERIFIED]CLIENT_SIDE_ONLY_CRYPTO
[VERIFIED]DOUBLE_LAYER_ENCRYPTION
[VERIFIED]ZERO_KNOWLEDGE_RECOVERY
[VERIFIED]NO_TELEMETRY
[VERIFIED]OPEN_SOURCE_CODE

THREAT_MODEL

Even if the server infrastructure is fully compromised, attackers face two independent encryption layers. Without your master password, brute-forcing 600k PBKDF2 iterations per attempt is computationally infeasible. Recovery keys are encrypted client-side — the server stores only opaque blobs it cannot read.

BEGIN_SECURE_SESSION

YOUR_SECRETS
STAY_YOURS

No subscriptions. No tracking. No backdoors. Zero-knowledge architecture means we are structurally incapable of accessing your vault — not just legally prohibited.

INPUT_MASTER_HASH

>ENTER_MASTER_KEY
BITS_PROCESSED: 0